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What Do We See in the Discourse 
of Vision 
CRAIG CALHOUN 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
From the cascading puns on visual language with which it opens, through its 
reports on the violent imagery of the College de Sociologie and the abstract 
antiocularcentrism of structuralists and poststructuralists, Martin Jay's book, 
Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French 
Thought, is about writing as well as seeing, the discourse of vision more than 
visuality itself, and the centrality of vision as well as its denigration. It is a big 
book and a learned one, full of fascinating connections and informative recov- 
eries of half-forgotten work. The book opens insights (one of many words that 
reading it makes difficult to use unself-consciously afterwards) into the work 
of an extremely wide range of late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century French 
thinkers. It refocuses our view of theories, old and new. It points to something 
pervasive that we may not have noticed adequately but ultimately fails to 
explain why this is so important. 
Put another way, this is a work of intellectual history, focused on cultural 
theory, written with great theoretical acuity. Its intent seems to be theoretical 
and analytical, not only narrative, but its point is unclear. What Jay has done 
is to notice how issues of vision (including vision's violence and capacity to 
mislead) figure in an almost astonishing range of cultural analyses, theories, 
fictions, and related works. The issues of vision figure sometimes as tropes, 
sometimes as themes, sometimes as obsessions. They are occasionally linked 
by the influences that earlier works have on later ones and by the reaction 
formations so characteristic of French intellectual life. Jay identifies all he 
can, catalogues them, and uses them to help us grasp better the thoughts of 
these various thinkers, many well-known, a few obscure. But he also weaves 
them together, attempts to make of them a story of something happening in 
twentieth-century French thought, and here it is not clear whether there is any 
real unity. Did vision, or animosity to the centrality of vision to intellectual 
orientation, really shape the development of a coherent intellectual tradition in 
a basic way; or was it simply coincidentally prevalent throughout the last 
hundred years? It was clearly central to some thinkers, like Bataille, but for 
many others-denigrators as well as celebrants-it seems to have been as 
much a convenient figure for making points motivated elsewhere. 
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For all the implication that his narrative is leading somewhere, Jay winds up 
with a seven-and-a-half page conclusion that is the least satisfying, least 
persuasive part of his book. This takes nothing away from his scholarship, 
which is impressive as always, both in its range and its clarity of perception 
and exposition. It does raise questions both about his theme and object of 
attention and, in a somewhat more general way, about intellectual history 
itself. 
In a sense, what Downcast Eyes charts is the great organizing tension 
between phenomenology/existentialism and structuralism/poststructuralism 
as forces in modem French thought. It shows that each builds on and reacts to 
positions taken before they were conjured into being as philosophical posi- 
tions or "isms." To a lesser extent the book shows that positions in the debate 
were shaped by technology and other influences outside the near-solipsism of 
purely intellectual discourse, although this is never Jay's theme. His attention 
is never focused more than in passing on the social factors shaping intellectual 
currents or on the way in which intellectual history is embedded in a broader 
sort of history. He has written a very intellectualistic intellectual history, one 
that would be quite at home in the debates of small Parisian magazines. 
Indeed, one of the book's few stylistic flaws is the extent to which it depends 
on the reader's prior familiarity with most of the names and intellectual 
positions it addresses. Very French (though Jay first became famous as a 
historian of the Frankfurt School). 
The book gets its orientations and sense of narrative direction from a 
vantage point in the present. It is Derrida and Irigaray, Levinas and Lyotard 
who provide the apparent denouement. Indeed, there is considerable value in 
this. One of the problematic rhetorical tropes in much postmodernist dis- 
course is the claim to radical novelty. Too many postmodernists (epigoni more 
than major thinkers) fool themselves in this regard. One of the important 
accomplishments of Jay's book is to show a rather considerable prehistory to 
one of the most important of postmodernist themes. We understand post- 
modernists and poststructuralists (or more properly, the range of internally 
heterogeneous discourses and positions lumped together under those labels 
when seen from a distance) better for seeing that their anti-visual tropes and 
themes have long been developing. 
But did disenchantment with vision really point the way towards poststruc- 
turalism from the start? Or would we do better to see Downcast Eyes as a 
reading of how much later poststructuralist thinkers may have drawn from the 
late-nineteenth-century aesthetic crisis and, mostly indirectly from Bergson 
but more directly from Bataille and the Surrealists, Debord and the Lettrists, 
Lacan, Althusser, and even (though they would be loathe to admit it) Sartre 
and Merleau-Ponty. Focusing on their treatment of vision offers insight into 
the earlier thinkers, although not altogether on their own terms or with full 
attention to their own priorities. Jay's is a reading that derives its interest in 
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anti-visual discourse from the centrality of that discourse for poststructuralist 
thinkers and then looks at others as precursors. Merleau-Ponty's interest in the 
relationship between visible and invisible was, for example, rooted in a very 
different intellectual outlook and project; one wonders whether it was really a 
meditation on the same theme or on a different issue using similar words. 
Perhaps a comparison can make the point. Jay's earlier book, Marxism and 
Totality, traced the way in which a concept and a theme figured throughout an 
intellectual tradition. Successive chapters on different Marxist thinkers- 
Lukacs, Horkheimer, Adorno, Gramsci, and so forth-treated their different 
approaches to the notion of totality. Jay's analysis of those different ap- 
proaches helped to make sense both of their specific theories and the develop- 
ment of Marxist thought. Downcast Eyes is organized rather similarly. It, too, 
uses a common theme to develop analyses of disparate bodies of work, and it, 
too, brings clarification and insight. But the Marxist tradition is much more 
clearly one intellectual tradition than those of late-nineteenth- and twentieth- 
century French thought addressed in Downcast Eyes. And Jay offers more 
evidence (and we perhaps need less convincing) that totality figures in a basic 
way throughout the Marxist tradition, helps to distinguish the Marxist tradi- 
tion from others, and was the object of the same kind of interest for different 
Marxist theories (even where they gave the idea of totality different defini- 
tions). 
Jay is reasonable, then, in the modest phrasing of the first of his three 
conclusions: "A welter of overlapping attitudes, arguments, and assumptions 
shared by a large number of otherwise disparate thinkers has become apparent 
as never before" (p. 588). This becomes apparent because of Jay's analysis but 
also because recent poststructuralist debates have opened up the issue. This is 
not to suggest that he is wrong to see the continuity in the importance of vision 
and its denigration. Rather, it is to argue that his book would have benefited 
from a more explicit recognition of the retrospective constitution of its project 
to show how "the critique of ocularcentrism has helped fuel the concomitant 
weakening of faith among French intellectuals-and not them alone-in 
... the moder project of enlightenment" (p. 589). A pornographic interest 
in vision and violence thus links Bataille and Breton back to Sade and has a 
continuity forward into some parts of the postmodernist discourse, but it took 
other aspects of poststructuralism to turn this challenge to Enlightenment into 
an intellectual interrogation of the modernist intellectual project. Jay's text is 
thematically integrated to the extent that it implicitly leads toward the French 
intellectuals' recent loss of faith in the modernist project, in ideas of sensory 
perception prior to writing or regimes of power, and in truth itself. But it is not 
clear that this is a "progressive" development nor that the various interroga- 
tions of vision by thinkers such as Merleau-Ponty and Sartre are best inter- 
preted as steps on this path. They may have been, but to claim them as such 
requires an argument about connection, not only a demonstration of "overlap- 
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ping attitudes, arguments, and assumptions." And in that connection, we can 
wonder even about the postmodernists. It remains unclear what status to 
ascribe to the attack on vision that Jay clearly shows runs through poststruc- 
turalist work. Is it metaphor or rhetorical device or motive or theme? Is it the 
point-or a way of getting some other point across? 
In a sense, Jay's third conclusion really points to what makes his book 
interesting and useful: It charts a myriad of different ways in which "the 
antiocularcentric discourse has successfully posed substantial and troubling 
questions about the status of visuality in the dominant cultural traditions of the 
West" (p. 589). It is perhaps not the unity of the thinkers studied but their 
diversity that is most interesting. What is demonstrated in the end is not so 
much the progressive development of a valid or successful critique (after all, 
if the proof of the pudding is in the eating, much of this thought has proved 
indigestible, and neo-Kantians may yet carry the day). It is the very centrality 
of visuality itself that leaps from Jay's pages. What is demonstrated is that a 
wide range of thinkers felt compelled to respond to that centrality in the 
course of theorizing about contemporary life or taking up a critical stance on 
modernity. Jay (and the poststructuralists who underpin this aspect of his 
argument) may or may not be right that the West has been distinctively 
ocularcentric and that this is constitutive of Western intellectual traditions. 
Establishing this would require comparative analysis. But he is clearly right to 
discover an ubiquity of visuality in modern French discourse, and it may be 
this ubiquity of visuality that links the critiques more than the internal devel- 
opment of a single intellectual tradition. 
I have remarked on the tension between phenomenology/existentialism and 
structuralism-poststructuralism that has been constitutive for so many de- 
bates. It may be that we are mislead by the polemical and reactive character of 
so much French writing. It may be that what is distinctive about French 
thought is the centrality of both phenomenology/existentialism and structural- 
ism/poststructuralism and their serious and sustained interrelationship and 
that this crucially informs both the focus on the visual and its denigration. In 
other words, labels like postmodernism and poststructuralism may be mis- 
leading; even the sharp distinction of structuralism from phenomenology, 
surely accurate at one level, can be misleading at another. For the manner of 
focus on the relationship between the phenomenal and the constituted, the 
seen or spoken and the written, the habitually and the intentionally enacted is 
shaped by the presence of both traditions in the discourse. As Robert DeNoon 
Cumming once remarked in a class, some Germans make a project of dialec- 
tics, but it comes naturally for the French. 
The attack on the primacy of the visual is an internal argument within this 
conflictual, dialectically constituted discourse. Or rather, several different 
attacks on the primacy of the visual have taken shape within this discourse, 
precisely because that primacy is never altogether shaken. As Jay writes, "the 
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tenacious hold of ocularcentrism over Western culture . .. was abetted by the 
oscillation among models of speculation, observation, and revelation" 
(p. 236). The phrase is neat, reminding us that theory, empiricism, and direct 
(including religious) intuition not only share Western culture but draw on its 
visual rhetoric. In this context, there can be a critique of the gaze and a call for 
reduction in the privileging of the eye; but an antivisual puritanism is as 
Quixotic as an attempt to speak or write without metaphors. It is akin to trying 
to do away entirely with representation, and as Derrida would suggest, such a 
desire is not only doomed but stems from the very metaphysics of presence 
that it seems to criticize, perpetuating the illusion that there might be a more 
direct access to knowledge. 
Many of the most powerful "denigrations" of vision that Jay discusses turn 
out to be less one-sided rejections than ambivalent engagements. For the most 
part, moreover, they are engagements not with visuality as such but with 
modalities of vision: the gaze, the photograph, the spectacle. Thus, Sartre and 
later feminists in different ways chart the violence and pornography of the 
gaze (without ever suggesting quite that we should stop seeing); Barthes 
points to the false immediacy of the photograph ("an illogical conjunction 
between the here-now and the there-then," quoted by Jay, p. 443); and Debord 
analyzes the alienation implicit in the spectacle ("a social relation among 
people, mediated by images," quoted p. 427) without demonizing vision as 
such. 
One of the things that a too-simplistic claim to a general denigration of 
vision would miss is the politics of the challenges posed by many of the 
thinkers that Jay discusses. In fact, Jay's actual accounts are not so simple, 
and they do not miss the politics (though his intellectualistic reading makes it 
hard to do justice to this side of the matter). He recognizes, for example, that 
the Lettrists, including the young Debord, were seeking to create "disruptive 
aesthetic situations with political implications" (p. 421). This might be a 
motto for what many French thinkers were doing in their critical engagements 
with various modalities of vision. They sought to disrupt stable rhetorics, 
modes of perception, and theories, nearly always with political intent. Under- 
standing them fully may require an analysis of what was at stake politically 
and why this sort of intellectual activity could seem to be a mode of signifi- 
cant political action. This, of course, cannot be sorted out within a purely 
intellectual history. 
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